# Psychoanalysis Aff JF16

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Power in American society is predicated on our societal fear of biological death that makes enjoying life impossible. This allows for coercive and nonexistent threats that turn the Other into something dangerous that we should protect ourselves from. Live humans create productivity for those in power, but when we reduce life to productivity, life becomes meaningless for us all. **Robinson 12:**

Andrew Robinson (Author, writer for Ceasefire Magazine, political theorist and activist based in the UK)”Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death” March 30, 2012. https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-2/

Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules.  When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place.  **It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence.**  Through splits, **people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’.**  For instance, **westerners invent the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations**; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development.  In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object.  Yet the resultant purity is illusory.  For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society.  “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. **The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power.  Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited.  The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life.  People are compelled to survive so as to become useful.**  For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends.  It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation.

**In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society.**  For example, elderly people are excluded from society.  People no longer expect their own death.  As a result, it becomes unintelligible.  It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’.  It can no longer be absorbed through ritual.  Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’.

**This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol.  The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way.  We may only die if law and medicine allow it.  Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations.  On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value.**  Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death.  It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here.  **People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value.**  On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette.  **This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated.** The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination.

Societal fear of death is a root cause of violence, we use culture to assuage this fear so when we’re faced with the different culture of the Other we lash out in fear of mortality – this is empirically and historically proven. **Solomon et al 2k**

Sheldon Solomon (prof of psych at Brooklyn College), Jeff Greenberg (prof of psych at University of Arizona), and Tom Pyszcynski (prof of psych at University of Colorado) “Fear of Death and Social Behavior” *Current Directions in Psychological Science*. 2000. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20182670?seq=1#page\_scan\_tab\_contents

Terror management theory posits that **awareness of mortality engenders** a potential for paralyzing **terror, which is assuaged by cultural** **worldviews**: humanly created, shared beliefs **that provide individuals with the sense they are** valuable members of an enduring, meaningful universe (self-esteem), and hence are **qualified for safety** and continuance beyond death. Thus, self-esteem serves the fundamental psychological function of buffering anxiety. In support of this view, studies have shown that bolstering selfesteem reduces anxiety and that reminders of mortality intensify striving for self-esteem; this research suggests that self-esteem is critical for psychological equanimity. Cultural worldviews serve the fundamental psychological function of providing the basis for death transcendence. To the extent this is true, reminders of mortality should stimulate bolstering of one’s worldview. **More than 80 studies have supported this idea**, most commonly by demonstrating that **making death momentarily salient increases** liking for people who support one’s worldview and **hostility toward** those with **alternative worldviews**. This work **helps explain human** beings’ dreadful **history of** intergroup prejudice and **violence**: The mere existence of **people with different beliefs [threaten] our primary** basis of **psychological security; we** therefore **respond by** derogation, assimilation efforts, or **annihilation**. Why has history been plagued by a succession of appalling ethnic cleansings? Archaeologists have found bas-reliefs from 1100 B.C. depicting Assyrian invaders’ practice of killing indigenous people by sticking them alive on stakes from groin to shoulder. These xenophobic propensities reached their zenith in the 20th century, when Hitler’s Nazi regime perpetuated the most extensive effort at genocide in history, and have continued to resurface throughout the world in places such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and the United States— where in 1999 A.D. at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, two Nazi-influenced teenagers massacred schoolmates, seemingly provoked by threats not to material well-being, but to the abstract entity known as self-esteem.

**The quest for immortality implicit in a view of death as valueless destroys all value to life—this precludes all ethical questions. Babich 94**

Babette E. Babich, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, Nietzsche's Philosophy of Science: Reflecting Science On the Ground of Art and Life, SUNY Series, the Margins of Literature, State University of New York Press Pg. 194-196

Without Price: **The** Will to Truth as the Will to Life As we have seen, the democratic or (for Nietzsche, decadent) **drive of scientific culture is** expressed in the Will to Truth. The Will to Truth reigns in science because the decadent moral ideal of its culture proclaims not merely a will to life, but **a will to life at any price.** The motif of self-preservation, or survival is, by its own definition, an insistent, desperate one. **What is desired** in the will to life at any price **is not at all** life or **living,** per se. What is willed is much rather **simply the preservation of life,** perhaps as little as possible, perhaps **so that one may have it for as long as possible,** perhaps as painlessly as possible. **What is essential is merely that one "have" and not that one "live" life.** Our words betray our values. Thus **we** tend to **say, "Life involves risk" as if it were possible to exclude risk with** a little **care. This** possibility **is impossible. Life is fundamentally risk.** In what Anaximander expresses as the supreme principle of the cosmos (which Schopenhauer understood so well), the contradictory heart of the living thing sounds the promise of its evanescence. The longing for life at any rate, at any price denies physiological finitude**.** And life is nothing but physiological finitude. **The desire for immortality manifests** the **nihilism[.]** of a longing for life at any price, sans aucun risque. **Because life cannot be held in stock** nor ultimately preserved, **the will to life is fundamentally opposed to the essence of life.**

**Disavowal of finitude is the foundational condition for American violence—if death is bad for the powerful, we make death unimaginably bad for the Other**

**Peterson 07**

Christopher Peterson (prof of psychology at the University of Michigan, former chair of the clinical psychology area), *Kindred Specters*: *Death, Mourning and American Affinity*, University of Minnesota Press

For Bauman, however, **the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences**. **Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties**,'" for instance, **Bauman remarks that** ::**the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline**" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that **death is "socially managed "by securing the Immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others** (35, his emphasis).1^ The **belief in my self-presence**, which is also always a belief in my immortality, **is thus** **dialectically conditioned** **by** the **nonpresence of others**. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead**—**bothfiguratively and literally**.** Indeed**,** this gesturebothaccompanies and reinforces thelarger cultural dissimulationofmortality by makingracial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. **The history of American slavery** **tells a familiar story of how American consciousness** **disavows and projects mortality onto its ''others."** Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."^ For Patterson, slavery—across its various historical forms—emerges as a substitute for death, a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. **As a substitution for death,** **slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death,"** for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). **This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation**," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that **the presumptive ontology of slave-owning,** legally recognized kinship, **was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself.** Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, ::for a people who made much of their newness'—their potential, freedom, and innocence—it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is."^ For Morrison, African-American **slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness** **did not** so much **threaten** the ostensible "**newness" of American life as it conditioned [America’s] the latter's appearance as new and free**. Hence "**freedom**," she writes, **"has no meaning...without** **the specter of enslavement**" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's infamous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field.From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side"—so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls "spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations— noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife —would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, 'for cultures that fear death...necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror" (5). **American necrophilia**, according to Castronovo, **responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death.** **Castronovo thus aims to turn us** away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife **toward** "**specific forms of corporeality**," **such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body,** in order **to avoid** "reinserting] **patterns of abstraction**" (17). **Yet**, **this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body**," **and therefore of a self-contained, self-present entity**. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, **it does not follow** that **a move toward embodiment remedies** such a **spiritualized politics.** Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body "does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether—as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. **A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is** also **legible in** Sharon Holland's **Raising the Dead,** which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."^ **Drawing from the activist slogan "silence=death**" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, **and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally**, Holland **observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable**"

**Specifically handguns are purchased out of fear of lethal violence from the Other – the 1ACs psychological discussion of gun ownership is key to understanding why it exists and the nature of its effects. Kleck et al 11**

Gary Kleck, Tomislav Kovandzic, Mark Saver, and Will Hauser. “The Effect of Perceived Risk and Victimization on Plans to Purchase a Gun for Self-protection.” Journal of Criminal Justice 39.4 (2011): 312-19. Web. 20 Jan. 2015. https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=258156

Why do millions of Americans bring deadly weapons into their homes? While **national surveys of Americans** have consistently shown that most gun owners and long-gun owners in particular, own them primarily for hunting or target shooting, the surveys also **reveal that** a large subset of gun owners, and **most handgun owners, own them primarily for self-protection** (see Kleck, 1997, Ch. 3). In a 1994 national survey, for example, 46 percent of all gun owners reported that the primary reason they owned guns was for self-protection (the National Survey of the Private Ownership of Firearms (NSPOF) - Cook & Ludwig, 1996, p. 38). **Further, among** **persons who owned only handguns, 74 percent reported that protection was their primary reason for owning the gun**, with target/sport shooting a distant second (10.8 percent). While those who own only long guns own them primarily for target/sport shooting, even among this subset of owners, 15 percent owned them primarily for protection (Cook & Ludwig, 1996, p. 39). The finding in the NSPOF survey that selfprotection is the primary motivator of most handgun ownership is largely consistent with results from other national surveys, and is noteworthy because it is primarily this subcategory of guns that have been the target of the strongest control efforts (Kleck, 1997). This is probably because of the greater involvement of such guns in violent crime, and the fact that gun types within this category (e.g., Saturday Night Specials, assault weapons) are more politically susceptible to government regulation as they are owned by smaller numbers of voters (Cook, 1991; Kleck, 1997). **Understanding the factors that lead people to obtain guns for self-protection is important for both theoretical and policy reasons**. Theoretically, the identification of significant individual and contextual determinants will provide for a better understanding of the nature of protective gun ownership. **It can also help clarify why high rates of crime and high levels of gun ownership are often found in the same places and times.** Practically, knowledge of these factors should prove useful to policymakers who consider gun control an effective strategy for preventing violence since these factors will ultimately play an important role in the willingness of defensive gun owners to remove guns from their homes or induce prospective owners to forego acquiring them in the first place (Kleck & Kovandzic, 2009). The most widely cited theoretical explanation for **why people acquire firearms for self-protection**, and the focus of the present study, **derives from the “fear of crime”** or **“perceived risk”** (hereafter referred to as fear/risk), **and “victimization” traditions** (Cao, Cullen, & Link, 1997; Dejong, 1997; Kleck, 1997; Williams & McGrath, 1976). **This perspective views defensive gun ownership as an individualistic psychological coping mechanism** for dealing with the “threat - actual, perceived, or emotional - posed by crime” (Cao et al., 1997; Reid et al., 1998). Thus, fear or perceived risk of criminal victimization could motivate gun acquisition.

**A handgun ban will never happen, the schematics of politics make it a political impossibility.**

**Scher 15**

Bill Scher (senior writer, Campaign for America’s Future). “Will Any Presidential Candidate Support Banning Handguns?” Common Dreams. October 3rd, 2015. http://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/10/03/will-any-presidential-candidate-support-banning-handguns

Politicians generally avoid proposing handgun bans because the position doesn’t fit into the frame of exempting “responsible gun owners” from new regulations. No one needs an assault rifle to hunt or to protect themselves. But plenty of Americans keep handguns thinking that it will protect them from harm. **Politicians are loathe to advocate that the government “take their guns away.”** However, the reality is, as physicist David Robert Grimes put it, “actually owning and using a firearm hugely increases the risk of being shot.” Of course, **this is a political impossibility** for the foreseeable future. The current Republican Congress won’t even pass an expansion of background checks, and a previous Republican Congress allowed the Clinton-era assault weapons ban to expire. A handgun ban also could run afoul of the Supreme Court, as it is currently constituted.

**There’s a reason for this though. Truth has become meaningless in the face of social psychology. Mass shootings are rising but support for gun control is at all-time lows, this is fear of death in action. Questioning underlying ideology is prerequisite to meaningful debate on handguns. Arnett 15:**

George Arnett (data analyst and journalist for the Guardian), “Mass shootings have no effect on the public debate about gun ownership in US”. The Guardian. October 2, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/oct/02/mass-shootings-have-no-impact-on-support-for-gun-rights-in-the-us

**Mass shootings occur almost once a day in the US, yet protecting gun rights seems to concern Americans more than increasing controls on guns.** On Thursday, a gunman killed nine people in a community college in Oregon. It was the 994th gun incident in which there were four or more victims (including the shooter) since the start of 2013, according to the website Mass Shooting Tracker. The data shows that excluding Thursday’s shootings, there have been 375 deaths and 1,089 injuries in 2015 so far. The website began to collect the figures on known incidents just after 20 children were gunned down in December 2012 at Sandy Hook elementary school in Newtown, Connecticut. Speaking from Washington after the killing spree, Barack Obama said: “We’ve become numb to this” – and he seems to be right. **December 2014 marked the first time in two decades of polling that those feeling strongly that the rights of Americans to own guns should be bolstered were in the majority, according to Pew Research. According to the survey, 52% said it was more important to protect Americans’ right to own guns, in contrast with 46% who said it was more important to control ownership of the weapons.** Those supporting gun control were in the majority immediately after the Newtown shootings, with 51% backing it in the US in January 2013. However, that share had dropped by five percentage points by the end of 2014. Between those two surveys, the proportion agreeing with the idea that gun ownership protects people from becoming victims of crime increased from 48% to 57%. According to another poll released earlier this year, while the vast majority of the public supports background checks most with an opinion are against stricter gun controls. **Part of this seems to be down to misperception. In a 2014 Gallup survey, 63% of Americans said they thought violent crime was increasing despite the rate hovering at near 20-year lows. The Pew data from December 2014 showed that 63% of those surveyed thought that keeping a gun in the home made them safer, compared with 35% 15 years before. In other words, Americans feel less safe and think a gun might be able to protect them.** Nearly 11m guns were manufactured in the US in 2013, with a total of just below 16m entering circulation after legal imports are included, according to the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. The Small Arms Survey from 2011 suggested that the US had by far the highest rate of guns per capita in the world with 89 for every 100 residents. This is far above the 55 per 100 residents in Yemen and nearly twice the proportion of the third-most armed developed country in the world, Switzerland, which has 46 per 100 people in its population. This does not mean 89% of Americans own a gun [.](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/04/a-minority-of-americans-own-guns-but-just-how-many-is-unclear/)According to a 2013 Pew survey, about 37% of households had one. However, the US has the highest murder rate after Mexico of any OECD country with about two-thirds of those deaths involving a firearm. **But no matter how many mass shootings there have been, it seems the argument** **that increasing controls on firearm ownership will make Americans safer is clearly not cutting it with the US public.**

**I affirm the resolution as a symbolic act of identifying with the Other. We are violently skeptical of the Other because we isolate the fear of death to ourselves and those we identify with – the Other becomes an unrealistic entity out to destroy us that transcends death. This is why the War on Terror is based in the fear of terror attacks here but innocent deaths abroad go ignored in the West. Only by putting down the tools used to “protect” ourselves from the dangerous Other and recognizing our common psychological struggles can we understand social antagonisms and reduce violent egoism. Stavrakakis 99**

Yannis Stavrakakis (Fellow, University of Essex), “Lacan and the Political: Thinking the Politics”, 1999. http://www.mediafire.com/view/f5ei7v5r2yuiidp/Stavrakakis\_-\_Lacan\_and\_the\_political.pdf

By saying ‘We are all Jews!’, ‘We all live in Chernobyl!’ or ‘We are all boat people!’ - all paradigms used by Zizek in Looking Awry - **we elevate the symptom, the excluded truth of the social** **field** (which has been stigmatized as an alien particularity) to the place of the universal - **to the point of our common identification** which was, up to now, sustained by its exclusion or elimination. The same happens when we say ‘We are all gypsies!’ - the central slogan in a recent anti-racist protest in Athens - or **when it is argued that we will be in a stronger position to fight anti-Semitism** only **when the Holocaust is recognized as a** true **part of all and not only of Jewish history**, this localization silencing its significance; only when ‘**on finding out what happened, everyone**, and not just the Jews, **thinks:** “**it could have been me** - the victim that is.”’ **What is promoted here is an attitude consistent with identifying with the symptom of the social and traversing social fantasy**. It is only by **accepting such an impossible representation,** by making this declaration of impossibility that it is possible to ‘represent’ the impossible or rather to identify with the impossibility of its representation. Identification with the symptom is thus related to the traversing of fantasy. **Going through fantasy entails the realization of the lack or inconsistency in the Other which is masked by fantasy**, the separation between objet petit a and the Other, a separation which is not only ethically sound but also ‘liberating’ for our political imagination: It is precisely this lack in the Other which enables the subject to achieve a kind of ‘de-alienation’ called by Lacan separation [in the sense that it is realized] that the Other itself ‘hasn’t got it’, hasn’t got the final answer. **This lack in the Other gives the subject** - so to speak - **a breathing space,** it enables him to avoid the total alienation in the signifier not by filling out his lack but **by allowing [them] to identify [themselves], [their] own lack, with the lack in the Other**.

**In a country with the NRA and the 2nd Amendment, the 1AC would never happen. By fiating that the United States federal government does something it won’t, the 1AC takes the political system hostage. Either the 1AC is right and we must change the system, or the system silences us, shatters its liberal appearance, and gives our death contradictory value. My symbolic hostage taking is the process necessary to produce new mindsets that lead to revolutionary change. The idea of material change cannot be separated from a prior immaterial change. Baudrillard 76**

Jean Baudrillard (Philosopher of the upmost Swag) “Symbolic Exchange and Death” 1976.

**We will not destroy the system by a direct,**dialectical **revolution** of the economic or political infrastructure . Everything produced by contradiction, by the relation of forces, or by energy in general , will only feed back into the mechanism and give it impetus, following a circular distortion similar to a Moebius strip. **We will never defeat it by following its own logic of energy, calculation, reason and revolution, history and power, or some finality or counter finality. The worst violence at this level has no purchase, and will only backfire against itself.** We will never defeat the system on the plane of the real: **the worst error of all our revolutionary strategies is to believe that we will put an end to the system on the plane of the real:** this is their imaginary, imposed on them by the system itself, living or surviving only by always leading those who attack the system to fight amongst each other on the terrain of reality, which is always the reality of the system. This is where they throw all their energies, their imaginary violence, where an implacable logic constantly turns back into the system. We have only to do it violence or counter-violence since it thrives on symbolic violence - not in the degraded sense in which this formula has found fortune, as a violence 'of signs' , from which the system draws strength, or with which it 'masks' its material violence: symbolic violence is deduced from a logic of the symbolic (which has nothing to do with the sign or with energy): reversal , the incessant reversibility o f the counter-gift and, conversely, the seizing of power by the unilateral exercise of the gift. 25 We must therefore displace everything into the sphere of the symbolic, where challenge , reversal and overbidding are the law, so that we can respond to death only by an equal or superior death. There is no question here of real violence or force, the only question concerns the challenge and the logic of the symbolic. If domination comes from the system's retention of the exclusivity of the gift without counter-gift - the gift of work which can only be responded to by destruction or sacrifice, if not in consumption , which is only a spiral of the system of surplus-gratification without result, therefore a spiral of surplus-domination , a gift of media and messages to which , due to the monopoly of the code , **nothing is allowed to retort**; the gift , everywhere and at every instant, of the social , of the protection agency, security, gratification and the solicitation of the social from which nothing is any longer permitted to escape - then the only solution is to turn the principle of its power back against the system itself: the impossibility of responding or retorting. **To defy the system with a gift to which it cannot respond save by its own collapse and death.**Nothing, not even the system, can avoid the symbolic obligation , and it is in this trap that the only chance of a catastrophe for capital remains. **The system turns on itself, as a scorpion does when encircled by the challenge of death. For it is summoned to answer, if it is not to lose face, to what can only be death. The system must itself commit suicide in response to the multiplied challenge of death and suicide.** **So hostages are taken.** On the symbolic or sacrificial plane, from which every moral consideration of the innocence of the victims is ruled out, the hostage is the substitute, the alter-ego of the ' terrorist' - the hostage's death for the terrorist's. Hostage and terrorist may thereafter become confused in the same sacrificial act. The stakes are death without any possibility of negotiation, and therefore return to an inevitable overbidding. Of course, they attempt to deploy the whole system of negotiation, and the terrorists themselves often enter into this exchange scenario in terms of this calculated equivalence (the hostages' lives against some ransom or liberation, or indeed for the prestige of the operation alone). From this perspective, taking hostages is not original at all it simply creates an unforeseen and selective relation of forces which can be resolved either by traditional violence or by negotiation. It is a tactical action. There is something else at stake, however, as we clearly saw at The Hague over the course of ten days of incredible negotiations: **no-one knew what could be negotiated, nor could they agree on terms, nor on the possible equivalences of the exchange**. Or again, even if they were formulated, the 'terrorists' demands' amounted to a radical denial of negotiation. It is precisely here that everything is played out, for with the impossibility of all negotiation we pass into the symbolic order, which is ignorant of this type of calculation and exchange (the system itself lives solely by negotiation, even if this takes place in the equilibrium of violence). **The system can only respond to this irruption of the symbolic** (the most serious thing to befall it, basically the only ' revolution' ) **by the real, physical death of the terrorists. This, however, is its defeat, since their death was their stake, so that by bringing about their deaths the system has merely impaled itself on its own violence without really responding to the challenge that was thrown to it.** Because the system can easily compute every death, even war atrocities, but cannot compute the death-challenge or symbolic death , since this death has no calculable equivalent, it opens up an inexpiable overbidding by other means than a death in exchange. Nothing corresponds to death except death. Which is precisely what happens in this case: the system itself is driven to suicide in return, which suicide is manifest in its disarray and defeat. However infinitesimal in terms of relations of forces it might be, the colossal apparatus of power is eliminated in this situation where (the very excess of its) derision is turned back against itself. The police and the army, all the institutions and mobilised violence of power whether individually or massed together, can do nothing against this lowly but symbolic death. For this death draws it onto a plane where there is no longer any response possible for it (hence the sudden structural liquefaction of power in '68, not because it was less strong, but because of the simple symbolic displacement operated by the students' practices) . The system can only die in exchange, defeat itself to lift the challenge. Its death at this instant is a symbolic response, but a death which wears it out. The challenge has the efficiency of a murderer. Every society apart from ours knows that, or used to know it. Ours is in the process of rediscovering it. The routes of symbolic effectiveness are those of an alternative politics. Thus the dying ascetic challenges God ever to give him the equivalent of this death. God does all he can to give him this equivalent 'a hundred times over' , in the form of prestige , of spiritual power, indeed of global hegemony But the ascetic's secret dream is to attain such an extent of mortification that even God would be unable either to take up the challenge , or to absorb the debt . He will then have triumphed over God, and become God himself. That is why the ascetic is always close to heresy and sacrilege , and as such condemned by the Church , whose function it is merely to preserve God from this symbolic face-to-face, to protect Him from this mortal challenge where He is summoned to die, to sacrifice Himself in order to take up the challenge of the mortified ascetic. The Church will have had this role for all time, avoiding this type of catastrophic confrontation (catastrophic primarily for the Church) and substituting a rule-bound exchange of penitences and gratifications, the impressario of a system of equivalences between God and men. The same situation exists in our relation to the system of power. All these institutions, all these social, economic, political and psychological mediations, are there so that no-one ever has the opportunity to issue this symbolic challenge, this challenge to the death, the irreversible gift which, like the absolute mortification of the ascetic, brings about a victory over all power, however powerful its authority maybe. It is no longer necessary that the possibility of this direct symbolic confrontation ever takes place. And this is the source of our profound boredom. **This is why taking hostages and other similar acts rekindle some fascination: they are at once an exorbitant mirror for the system of its own repressive violence**, and the model of a symbolic violence which is always forbidden it, the only violence it cannot exert: its own death.

**Therefore role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who better assesses our psychological relationship with systems of power in the context of the topic. This is done by arguing for what the psychological drive behind action is and then arguing why that affirms or negates. The education from this discourse weighs on the same layer as theory. These arguments are generated from flow-based arguments, but like my Baudrillard argument that can constitute arguments that give value to specific discourse.**

**Psychoanalysis allows us to understand the gaze of the Other which is the evaluative model that all of our actions appeal to. Understanding the social psychology of the topic is key to any substantive engagement because we can’t understand political action without understanding the mindsets that create it. Dean 05**

Jodi Dean. “Enjoyment as a Category of Political Thought.”Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, September, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/aspa\_05\_enjoyment.doc 2005.

Zizek also differs from Foucault with respect to the status or place of the subjectivized practices. Whereas Foucault accounts for the unity of disciplinary practices by referring to the dispersion of specific logics of power (logics around confession and speaking, observation and surveillance, examination and judgment as they take material form in architectures, urban planning, and designs for education and punishment, for example), **Zizek addresses a peculiar fact about the subject’s performance of its practices: the gaze before which it imagines itself performing. This gaze constitutes “the Other who registers my acts in the symbolic network**.”19 Following Lacan, Zizek understands this gaze as the ego ideal, as a point of symbolic identification. The gaze is more than the product of a particular architecture intended to install normalizing judgment and discipline the behavior of the observed (for example, the panopticon as introduced by Jeremy Bentham and elaborated by Foucault). Instead, for Zizek**, the gaze is a crucial supposition for the very capacity to act at all.** Identifying with the gaze enables the subject to be active. **The gaze is the point from which one sees one’s actions as valuable and worthwhile, as making sense. Absent that gaze, one may feel trapped, passive, unsure as to the point of doing anything at all.** This gaze, then, structures our relation to our practices. **Instead of experiencing the state as myriad forms and organizations**, branches, and edicts, presences and regulations, say, **in our daily activities we posit the state as a kind of entity, an other, aware of what we are doing** (a positing that, unfortunately, makes ever more sense as it is materialized in surveillance technologies). Similarly, we may posit an enemy assessing our every action. The point, then, is that **through symbolic identification the subject posits the very entity it understands itself as responding to. And how it imagines this other will be crucial to the kinds of activities the subject can undertake**.

**We fiat things so that we can engage in meaningful debate but when we become an echo chamber and say our debates have a bearing on the real world when they don’t, fiat is always utopian. So presumption goes aff because I fiat it.**

# OVERVIEW

**AS CICERO ONCE SAID, “TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY IS TO LEARN TO DIE”**

**ALL ACTIONS COME FROM A PRIOR MINDSET THAT JUSTIFIES THAT THOUGHT, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS NOT FIT FOR A HANDGUN BAN SO WE NEED TO CREATE THOSE CONDITIONS FIRST – THAT’S THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT.**

**FEAR OF DEATH MAKES US UNRESPONSIVE TO REALITY, GUN VIOLENCE IS GROWING BUT THE DESIRE FOR GUNS IS RISING – THAT’S ARNETT. THIS IS BECAUSE THE PARADIGM OF FEAR OF DEATH MAKES US WANT TO PROTECT OURSELVES INSTEAD OF ACTUALLY TACKLING OUR SOCIAL ISSUES THAT ARE CREATING VIOLENCE. IF WE WANT CHANGE WE NEED TO DEMAND IT – THAT’S BAUDRILLARD. UNTIL WE CONFRONT THE “OTHER” THAT WE BELIEVE TO BE BEHIND GUN VIOLENCE WE WILL ONLY FURTHER MILITARIZE SOCIETY AND MAKE EXTREME VIOLENCE PART OF LIFE ITSELF.**

# FRONTLINES

### AT Theory Theory Theory

I’ve taken debate hostage

Theory is a performance of killing the 1AC because of the threat it poses to debate—that means don’t vote on it—3 reasons 1. Debate doesn’t collapse if you don’t vote on theory—means their threats are false 2. they fear engagement with the aff at the risk of losing, but we as a society should overcome our psychological threat construction—that bars our relationship to the Other—that’s Robinson—psychological discussions are a prior question for education—that’s Dean 3. Their rhetoric of exclusion based on fairness is based in only what’s fair for those who play the game of fiat that preserves fear of death linked to the state, they kill the 1ac this way which gives it’s death symbolic value and proves our point – that’s the Hostage doublebind in Baudrillard

#### Interpretation: In order to be topical the affirmative must not implement a policy.

#### B violation: I meet

#### To be resolved means to remain open to being-the resolution is not a question of policy rather it’s a question of how we should orient ourselves WITHOUT taking an action.

Pezze 06

Barbara Dalle Pezze [The Centre for the Humanities and Medicine, The University of Hong kong. PhD in Philosophy-- the University of Hong Kong "Heidegger on Gelassenheit," Minerva - Internet Journal of Philosophy 10 (2006): 94-122]

Let us pause for a moment to consider a possible misunderstanding. It could appear, from what we have been saying, that Gelassenheit“floats in the realm of unreality and so in nothingness, and, lacking all power of action, is a will-less letting in of everything and, basically, the denial of the will to live!” (1966a, p. 80). But this is not the case**, for** in the Gelassenheit we find something that recalls the “power of action,” but which is not a will. It is a “resolve” [*Entschlossenheit*] (ibid., p. 81**),** but not as an act of will that makes a decision and finds a solution to a problem or a situation. This “resolve,” as Heidegger himself suggests, must be thought as the one that is spoken of in *Being and Time*, that is, it is a “letting oneself be called forth” (1996, p. 283) to one’s ownmost possibility of being. “Resoluteness” **—** as *Entschlossenheit* is translated in *Being and Time* **—** is “authentic being a self**”** (1996, p. 274). It is quite difficult to think a resolve that is not a matter of will that moves to an action; we tend, in fact, to consider resoluteness as a strong determination to attain something. As we read in Heidegger’s *Introduction To Metaphysics* (2000), the essence of the resolve, as he intends it, is not an intention to act; it is not a ‘gathering of energy’ to be released into action. Resolve is the beginning, the inceptual beginning of any action moved. Here acting is not be taken as an action undertaken by Dasein in being resolute. Rather, acting refers to the existential and fundamental mode of being of Dasein, which is to be “care,” and which is the “primordial” being of Dasein. Resoluteness, in its essence, is the remaining open of Dasein for being. In the context of the Conversation, this resolve should thus be understood as “the opening of man particularly undertaken by him for openness...” [als das eigens übernommene Sichöffnen des Daseins für das Offene...] (Heidegger 1966a, p. 81). It is a resolve to remain open to being, and therefore to what is ownmost to man’s nature, which is disclosed in relation to being. This resolve is what Heidegger, in the Conversation, indicates as “releasement to that-which-regions,” the resolve to release oneself to that- which-regions, to remain open towards the openness itself.

Merriam Webster Defines Ban

**to forbid people from using (something) : to say that something cannot be used or done**

1. Common Usage-Merriam Webster is a super common dictionary
   1. Common usage o/w because the normative ways we use words is where the most lit, that matters because I defend the most predictable lit with the most ground AND I defend the topic in such a way that we gain the most education possible from a single aff.
2. The lack of an actor in the resolution means the aff doesn’t necessarily have to defend implementation rather that aff ground includes arguing a ban in a philosophical sense.
3. We defend the implementation of the res, except for us implementation is when we in debate say the resolution happens which is a symbolically powerful act per the 1AC. Their idea of implementation as the plan literally happening is ridiculous, we can’t make the aff happen – that’s a bad notion of education that bars the real world framing that the 1AC offers.
4. Forcing us to defend the res literally means we must endorse the harmful mindsets that sustain oppression in the status quo, the starting point for debate shouldn’t be mediocrity.

AT Spec Enforcement– Their interp is terminal defense on their education claims, they did not even listen to the 1AC if they expect me to specify a method of fiated enforcement by the US Federal Government when I critique this notion of fiat as the starting point for debate. Our method is a symbolic act of violence by making the US do something impossible that simultaneously reveals that our ideology bars us from a better society. All of their clash arguments are referring to an argument that the 1AC doesn’t make.

AT Mindset Shifts Bad – k2 material change – that’s Baudrillard. Generating a good method for material change comes first for education a) we don’t have access to these methods now b) opens up how we think, top layer on education. Best for fairness because if our existing mindsets are exclusive, fairness is just a misnomer in any context.

AT Comprehensive ROTB – I saw this coming so I rewrote the role of the ballot text to meet as much as possible so err aff on theory.

Counter-Interpretation: Their interp minus the fiat distinction plank. My critique of fiat still stands, which is a net benefit to my interp. I’ll impact that here. The divide between pre and post fiat is incredibly arbitrary as it stands.

AT Must Defend Implementation –

Full text disclosure of the aff since Emory solves their predictability/engagement arguments, it’s not hard to research answers to Baudrillard – policy backfiles have hundreds for free online.

Our ROTB link turns all of their fairness args because they can engage in it by just defending the squo

### AT Ethics

Prior Question - Extend Babich, the search for immortality inherent in fear of death drains life of value because we are only interested in the longevity of life and not its content. The question of making life of moral quality can only occur if the essence of life is appreciated over life itself.

Turn - Extend Robinson, fear of death allows social control to exist without limitation, powerful actors can always use images of death to coerce people and strip them of their freedom. For example, the US was able to pass the Patriot Act which severely limited citizen’s freedoms under the threat of weapons of mass destruction that didn’t exist.

**They mirror the political stasis that halts the notion of real change which I argue is why fiat cannot apply in the round. The aff’s invocation of moral rhetoric surrounding a handgun ban creates an us/them dichotomy—they’ve created a moral boundary between themselves and their opposition**

**Klemash in 13**

Andrew Klemash (American University). “Morality in Political Rhetoric: Examining the Effects of Moral Language in Debate Using the Contemporary Gun Control Controversy.” Honors Capstone. May 7th, 2013. <http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/15042/Klemash,%20Andrew%20-%20Spring%202013.pdf?sequence=1>

Using Moral Rhetoric in Political Debate Heated partisan language is not a new phenomenon in Washington. Yet, in the wake of a tragedy like the fatal mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, CT, one might expect the deadlock between sides to subside—if even slightly. However, with the renewed focus on gun control issues in politics, neither the proponents for nor the opponents to more gun control seem willing to budge, and in fact seem to be behaving more stubbornly than ever. A massacre of so many young children at the hands of a heavily armed gunman rallied the sympathies of the nation, but neither side was moved to alter their core position. This deadlock suggests that despite the issue is at hand, the political rhetoric regarding gun control unlikely to change no matter what tragedy occurs. Indeed, on both sides of the debate, the moral language used indicates that moderates and extremists are even more entrenched in their views than ever. The Sandy Hook massacre committed by a young shooter, Adam Lanza, was the latest of a recent spate of prolific tragedies involving gun violence. Due to the unique nature of the tragedy involving such young victims, the gun control debate was powerfully thrust to the forefront of the mind of every political pundit, columnist, blogger, and the general public. Suddenly everyone was rushing to make their political views on the issue known, and in the rush to do so the political rhetoric became flooded by calls to action and of a moral obligation for action. On one side stand those who are lobbying for more gun control: citizens, government officials, celebrities, interest groups, and organizations, whereas on the other side stand those lobbying against more gun control also including citizens, government officials, celebrities, interest groups, and organizations. Both sides were invited to be part of a month-long Vice Presidential commission in the wake of the tragedy, and both sides have the general population’s support. What separates one from the other are their views on what must be done. The question as to whether or not there needs to be more gun control is no doubt significant, yet one of the most interesting aspects of the contemporary debate is the use of moral rhetoric by both sides to support their own views as well as how they employ this language **to demoralize the position of their opponents**. Starting with the press conference where the results of the month-long commission were announced, the gun control debate has been shrouded in the political rhetoric of morality. There the Vice President said America has a **“moral obligation” to act**, and President Obama followed by saying that Congress and the government had a responsibility to prevent “evil” acts and furthermore that Americans have an “obligation” to do so in any way possible. While this instance was neither the first nor the most incendiary use of morality in the current gun control debate, the prolific nature of the press conference and the stature of the two men make the language that they did use very weighty. Moreover, invoking morality essentially means that a distinction is being drawn between what is good and what is bad or evil. In other words, **moral language serves as a dichotomous political tool for separating the morally “right” camp from the morally “wrong” camp in this debate.** Here, the pro-gun control camp argues that they have the moral support of the nation, and this claim is reinforced by their belief that their position is morally superior, while the anti-gun control camp had been thrown on the defensive from the beginning of the debate. Additionally, having been labeled as “bad” morally those opposing additional gun legislation have had to contend with being equated with other groups such as terrorists, criminals, or sexual deviants. The rhetoric regarding gun control has led to comparisons of both sides to Hitler’s Nazi Germany, which is logically absurd, for a critically thinking viewer of this exchange of rhetoric would conclude quite rationally that both sides cannot be acting like the Nazis. For example, prominent politician Mike Huckabee has made the comparison between gun control supporters and ultimate disarmament of the populace, which he claims was a key point of how the Nazi regime was able to come to power.3 In response, articles have been published by proponents of gun control stating that not only is the comparison unfair to them but also that perhaps the opponents of gun control are the ones with views most in line with Hitler’s Nazi Germany, with one article plainly stating “Hitler and pro-gun advocates want the same thing” referring to deregulation policies.4 In the context of this back-and-forth, the rhetoric is becoming increasingly heated, with a popular conservative website stating not only that “Hitler disarmed his domestic enemies before launching a genocide against them” but also that “left-wing blogs have successfully gamed Google’s search engine results so that when people searched for terms such as ‘Nazi gun control’, they were met with a plethora of articles claiming the historical bias for this connection was a fabrication.”5 The absurdity of the fact that both sides seem to be trying to compare the goals of the other to arguably the most evil regime in history is evidence of just how far people will go in their use of moral rhetoric to both demonize the other side and galvanize their own side against the opposition. Although most moral language in political rhetoric is not nearly as extreme as the above, it is significant to recall that while historically recognized as a driving force behind law and used as means to legitimize it, moral language itself rarely finds its way into the text of specific laws. However, the language of rights implies morality, and particularly in America, where rights are enshrined in the Constitution as the highest law of the land, and thus public moral support for the law as a “good” social structure is evidenced simply by observing the legal, executive, and justice systems. To call or imply that an argument is immoral is to imply that the argument is not right, not a right, and not lawful. In the press conference following Sandy Hook, both the President and Vice President used language of morals to describe the future action they desire, thereby **creating a moral boundary between their ideas and any opposition.** In addition to their moral language, the use of the word “obligation” is an **extraordinarily strong language** selection, for its use implies that anyone who does not feel they are obligated to act in such a way are not moral (or at least do not have the same morals as the speaker), **which creates a “us” and “them” mentality in listeners.**

### AT Levinas

**A Levinisian account of the Other prevents us from fully understanding and rectifying oppression**

**Kwak 12**

Hochul Kwak (Claremont Graduate University). “Rights of Concrete Others: Ethics of Concrete Others, Social Individuality, and Social Multiculturalism.” CGU Theses and Dissertations. 2012. <http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=cgu_etd>

Encountering the face of the other, we are to decide whether every human being is the other or only a certain being is the other: that is, whether all human beings are vulnerable or some of them are vulnerable. Since Levinas contends that the face itself is the revelation of the vulnerability of the other, all human beings are vulnerable. Though Levinas mentions a stranger, a widow, and an orphan in referring to the other, considering that the face itself reveals vulnerability, every human being whether an oppressor or a victim is the other. In principle, I agree that every human being without her political, economic, and cultural status is the other who deserves my ultimate responsibility not to kill her. This is because she has the dimension of transcendence. In this vein, if I only count the transcendent dimension of an oppressor, she deserves my welcome. But, an oppressor has an immanent dimension as every human being has both immanent and transcendental dimensions. In light of an immanent dimension, an oppressor is totally different from the oppressed. It is ambiguous whether Levinas differentiates the oppressed from oppressors; he is hesitant to judge the other. In dealing with immanent matters, for instance, Levinas emphasizes inadequacy of objective judgment: ―There exists a tyranny of the universal and of the impersonal, an order that is inhuman though distinct from the brutish. Against it man affirms himself as an irreducible singularity, exterior to the totality into which he enters, and aspiring to the religious order where the recognition of the individual concerns him in his singularity ... The judgment of history is always pronounced in absentia.‖ 33 Put differently, **to properly judge an individual as a singularity, Levinas contends that every individual should be treated as the transcendent and infinite other no matter who she is**. If every individual is a transcendent and infinite other, it is difficult to distinguish between oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiting and the exploited, ostracizers and the ostracized, to name a few. If the victims are not differentiated from victimizers, the idea of the other is unable to address the wrongs of the victimizers and accordingly the vulnerability of the victims remains the same. While Levinas protects transcendental vulnerability of the other in her face, he ends up ignoring different vulnerabilities between a victim and a victimizer.

The argument is that the other's transcendence is defined by the encounter with the human face in a sense, then, everyone is the other, which ignores the immanent differences between people that define structural oppression

Levinas’s transcendent view of alterity locks in economic injustices; we must reject the view that the Other can never be fully understood

**Kwak 12** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

First of all, the **Levinas**ian idea of the other **appears to make the other an angelic being. The other is a transcendent and infinite being who has absolute alterity**. It is unmediated by totality. Though Levinas specifically refers to the stranger, the widow, and the orphan as epiphany of the other, they have importance not as historical beings but as infinite and transcendent beings. Anselm Min says, ―At best, Levinas reduces the stranger, the widow, and the orphan to abstract symbols of human vulnerability in general, **with nothing historically concrete** and specific **about them**.‖ 26 As an angelic being, the other loses her concrete vulnerability. **While a stranger**, a widow, or an orphan **has** the **concrete political, economic**, medical, **or cultural vulnerability, an angelic being does not have such vulnerabilities**. That is to say, an angelic being does not have to worry about her political persecution, economic distress, medical disadvantages, or cultural ignorance. But, a stranger, a widow, or an orphan is overwhelmed by worries. She needs her shelter, employment, education, medical treatment, cultural recognition, and so on. Without addressing those concerns, a stranger, a widow, or an orphan is unable to overcome her vulnerability. **Whereas being transcendentally secured, the other for Levinas then remains concretely vulnerable**. Such limitation is caused by Levinas‘s rejection of an incarnational understanding of human beings. ―The Other is not the incarnation of God, but precisely his face, in which he is disincarnate, is the manifestation of the height in which God is revealed.‖27 Levinas denies the immanence of human beings in history while accepting their transcendence in history. Levinas‘s contribution is that he places special emphasis on the transcendental dimension of the other. However, if the transcendental dimension negates the immanent dimension of the other, the other is exposed to the aforementioned concrete vulnerability. **While the other without the transcendental** dimension **has experienced** the **imperialism of the same, the other without immanence will experience** indifference and **isolation from the same**. Diane Perpich puts it in this way: ―**Justice requires representation** – **and recognition**, too, we might add. **Levinas may well have been thinking of** representation in this passage only in the sense of the presentation of an object in consciousness, that is, as the **representation of persons in the abstract. But political representation**, as the right and actuality of having an effective voice in the civil society and government, clearly **is equally necessary** for justice. **The other whose identity is rendered** unintelligible or **unrepresentable is thus done an injustice**: an ethical as well as a political injustice‖ 28 As immanence of the other is ignored, the unintelligible and unrepresentable other is unrecognizable in civil society and accordingly aggravates her vulnerability. In order to address the vulnerability of the other, not only her transcendence but also her immanence should be taken into consideration: ―The ethical dignity of the other may ‗trace‘ its origin to her transcendent relation to the infinite, but that dignity is effectively destroyed or honored only in her immanent relations to history and society, and both the transcendent and the immanent relations are inseparably connected in the unity of the one person.‖ 29 With clear separation between transcendence and immanence, however, the other is not able to address the concrete vulnerability of the other.

### AT Curry

**The only real people we can affect in this round are those present here, voting for the symbolic act of taking the United States and positing it’ll do something it won’t is an identification that there is a severe disconnect between our debate advocacies and the political.**

### AT Overpolicing

**Link Turn - Gun violence in America disproportionately affects Black communities in the squo, because of this Black communities have historically supported gun control and your overpolicing args are a white liberalization of #BlackLivesMatter. Your false representations of the Black community mean you never actually engage the Other. Gutting 15**

Gary Gutting (professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame) “Guns and Racism” New York Times. December 28, 2015. <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/guns-and-racism/>

**We’ve heard a lot recently about how blacks still don’t feel safe in this country.** You can argue about how seriously to take complaints from black students at elite universities or even whether outrageous cases of unjustified police shootings are just isolated occurrences. **But there’s no argument that black people in the “bad parts” of our cities have to live with utterly unacceptable levels of gun violence. In 2010, blacks, who make up only 13 percent of the population, were 55 percent of gun homicide victims. It’s no surprise that blacks favor stricter gun controls considerably more than whites do.** How does racism enter into this picture? Let me put it in personal terms. I spend a fair amount of time **in Chicago**, where the newspapers regularly offer front-page reports of shootings from the previous night. Checking The Tribune on a recent morning, I learned that two people were killed and a dozen wounded. You might think that a steady stream of such reports (this year, Chicago will have over 2,700 shootings, with over 400 people killed) would induce high levels of fear, especially since many shootings occur on the streets.   In fact, I’m not particularly afraid, since — like most Chicagoans — I’m hardly ever where the violence occurs. **There’s something to worry about only if you live in certain overwhelmingly black communities on the West and South sides of town.** (The papers publish helpful maps showing how the killings are distributed.) **These are where almost all the shootings occur, and the large majority of victims** (and perpetrators) **are black**. The patterns are similar in other large American cities, so that those who live with gun violence as an imminent, personal threat are mostly black. But imagine if there regularly were shootings in previously “safe” white areas.   Now there are frequent killings on the Magnificent Mile, the Gold Coast and in Lincoln Park. Both the perpetrators and the victims are white, and, despite greatly increased police protection, the violence continues. Given the strong support for gun control among residents of these areas, the cause would quickly become very personal. Chicago has relatively strong gun laws, but the city borders on Indiana, where the laws are much laxer. My neighbors and I would join a vigorous and relentless campaign for stricter national gun laws. This isn’t our reaction to gun violence in black parts of town. Does this mean that we’re racists? Perhaps not. **Perhaps we just haven’t realized the extent to which gun violence is destroying urban black communities.** But once we realize this, our passion for justice and hatred of racism should galvanize us to action. Here the parallel to the Black Lives Matter movement is instructive. When black protesters convinced whites that striking examples of unjustified police violence were not just occasional aberrations, the whites supported protests against what they now saw as a racist practice. Similarly, white supporters of gun control should join with blacks —including mayors of major cities — who have recognized the racist effects of gun proliferation. The case for the racist effect of our permissive gun laws is especially powerful.  There’s no way of explaining away all these deaths as aberrations. If we fail to oppose with equal passion and vigor the relentless political pressure of (mostly white) gun advocates, we force a large number of black citizens to live with the constant threat of gun violence. **We’re in effect letting the Second Amendment trump the Fourteenth Amendment, implicitly preferring the right of gun ownership to the right of black people to live free from fear.**

And fear of death is the root cause of overpolicing because disproportionate localized violence leads to police marking certain communities and populations as lethal and waging war against the violent Other – that’s Solomon.

#### Neg is nonunique and Turn—widespread, private gun ownership fuels racist police brutality—“black self-defense” is self-defeating because it guarantees violence from cops

**Winkler 14**

Adam Winkler (professor of law @ UCLA). “Ferguson: With So Many Guns in America, Police Are Trained to Live in Fear.” Huffington Post. October 19th, 2014. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/ferguson-guns-america-police-fear\_b\_5688750.html

The fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an 18-year-old African American, by a white police officer has sparked protests and outrage in the small town of Ferguson, Missouri. It has also touched off debates throughout the United States on racial harassment by the police and the increasing militarization of ordinary law enforcement after 9/11. Those conversations are important ones for Americans to have. Lost in the discussion, however, has been the role guns played in creating the environment of hostility between police and communities like Ferguson. The problems of racial harassment and police militarization are exacerbated by the fact that America has a heavily-armed civilian population. While there are no official totals, there are an estimated 320 million guns in the United States, approximately one per person. It is often said that America has a gun culture, one that some celebrate and others bemoan. Whatever one's personal views about guns, there is no denying their presence in every American city, from Philadelphia to Ferguson. Nor should we fail to recognize the profound impact this has on law enforcement. **Because there are so many guns out there, police officers are trained to live in fear** of the very people they are supposed to protect and serve. Anytime a police officer pulls over a car, he or she must worry that the person inside that car will have a gun that could be turned on them. At training academies throughout the nation, new recruits are taught that cop-killers need two things: a will to kill and an opportunity to act. There's little an officer can do about will; anyone can have it without anyone else knowing. Officers can, however, limit the opportunities for a cop-killer to act by being prepared and quick to defend themselves. In many police departments, the training involves the use of high-tech video simulations that put prospective officers in real-life situations where they'll have to decide whether to use force. A recruit will be shown a video of an encounter, shot from the point of view of the officer. In one, an officer will approach a vehicle pulled over for speeding when suddenly the driver pulls a gun and shoots. In another, an officer responding to a report of an armed robbery will enter a store when a potential suspect approaches and unexpectedly pulls what could be a gun out of his back pocket, only this time the gun is a wallet. The training is designed to prepare officers for a career on streets where a lot of people are armed and police have to make split-second decisions about the use of force. Police are trained, in other words, to be on edge. The facts of the Brown shooting remain murky but the protests are motivated by a larger pattern: harassment of minorities by police. Communities of color know well that edgy cops and racial prejudice can be a dangerous brew. While inexcusable, racial stereotypes are predictably part of policing. Cops are taught to mistrust for self-protection, yet the vast majority of civilians they encounter are peaceful. It is little surprise that officers often fall back on racial or other stereotypes when faced with the difficult task of quickly determining who is a threat. Officers look for shortcuts to simplify high-pressure decisions. Such stereotypes are often misleading, reflecting the officer's biases especially in matters of race. They also endanger officers who lower their guard against people who don't fit the stereotypes and threaten civilians who do fit them. The Brown protests have also set off a debate about militarization of the police since 9/11. That militarization is partially a result of our heavily-armed civilian population. The armored vehicles that have become the symbol of militarization are being purchased by law enforcement agencies to protect officers against gunfire. Police are equipping themselves with a variety of high-powered firearms because they feel outgunned by the criminals they have to defend themselves against. For some Americans, a high-powered weapon is just a fun toy to use at the gun range. For police officers, it is a threat that must be taken seriously. As guns are part of the source of these law enforcement problems, no doubt some will suggest that gun regulation must also be part of the solution. Universal background checks, for example, can help keep guns out of the hands of those people who are more likely to threaten officers and other civilians. Restricting unusually high-powered weaponry reduces the need for the police to have even more powerful weapons for protection. Gun control, however, is no panacea and we should be realistic about what can be accomplished. This is not just a political question - whether the votes are there to support new laws - but a practical one. With so many guns already in circulation, police officers will not stop worrying about being shot and killed anytime soon. Americans strongly support civilian gun ownership, and the right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. There are some benefits to having this right, including the ability of people to defend themselves from criminals. Yet the shooting in Ferguson should also be cause to recognize how a heavily-armed civilian population adversely impacts policing and our communities.

either a) they have no brink scenario and the aff outweighs any tiny neg impacts or b) turn – the mindset shift produced by our symbolic stance reduces gun ownership and fear of death and overpolicing goes down.

**No link—Gourevitch makes ridiculous assumptions**

**Weisser 15**

Mike Weisser (he author of 6 books and more than 400 blogs which appear on my website and on Huffington Post. I only write about guns and related subjects). “**An Open Letter To Professor Alex Gourevitch**: Guns Are One Thing, Racism Is Another.” MikeTheGunGuy. June 29th, 2015. <http://mikethegunguy.com/2015/06/29/an-open-letter-to-professor-alex-gourevitch-guns-are-one-thing-racism-is-another/>

You recently published a long and detailed commentary on gun control and racism which I have read with interest and care. Your basic point seems to be that the usual response to mass killings, as reflected in President Obama’s first remarks about Charleston, is to call for stricter gun control laws which you believe will have the ultimate effect of increasing the racism of our criminal justice system while having no real impact on controlling gun violence, particularly mass gun violence. You assert that there are already too many arrests of minorities, too many racially-motivated defendant pleadings and too many incarcerations, all of which would simply increase if we institute more criminal laws to control gun violence in response to events like the slaughter at the Emanuel AME Church. roof You also bring to the discussion some comments about research by scholars like Levin, Fagan and others concerning stop-and-frisk policing methods employed by the NYPD whose value in allegedly bringing down gun crimes has been evaluated in both positive and negative terms. Some of this research argues that stop-and-frisk was entirely based on racist assumptions about who might have been walking around with illegal guns, and that this strategy, useful or not, was yet another example of an extra-legal effort to combat gun violence that served only to engender racism between the police and the community whom they are sworn to protect. I’d like to respond to the second issue first. It’s true that New York City experienced an unprecedented drop in gun violence first under Rudy and then continuing with Mayor Mike. And much of this decline is tied to stop-and-frisk policing tactics which is obviously tied to racial profiling which is tied to racism, etc. But you have to be careful about perhaps pushing this argument too far. The decline in violent crime and gun crime in particular since the mid-1990s (although the decline largely flattened out after 2000) occurred in virtually every metropolitan center whether a change in policing and police tactics took place or not. In fact, an entire cottage industry has grown up around figuring out why America and other OECD countries appear to be less violent over the last twenty years. I am not sure that any of the multiple crime-decline theories explain the issue pari passu, but inconvenient or not, scholars have yet to settle on a single, determining factor when it comes to explaining criminal behavior with guns. Now let’s move to your central argument, namely, that from the perspective of the inner-city community, more gun control means more criminal laws and, hence, more racism in the legal and penal systems that minority populations disproportionately endure. Nobody would or should argue that the penal process delivers equal justice to minorities and the poor. And with all due respect, we really didn’t need Dylann Roof to walk into Emanuel AME Church with a Glock 21 to remind us that racism is still alive and well. But **where I think your argument falters is the assumption that because the President calls for more gun control, there will be more criminal laws that will result in more minorities getting arrested, going up before a judge on some trumped-up charge and then going off to jail.** What is really happening is that laws making it easier for anyone to gain access to a gun, or carrying a gun on their person, or bringing that gun into what was formerly a gun-free zone have increased exponentially, while laws that restrict gun access or restrict ‘gun rights’ are the exception, not the rule. One year after Sandy Hook, 70 new laws had been passed easing gun restrictions, while only 39 more restrictive measures had been signed into law, half of which concerned updating mental health records, a strategy with minimal impact on controlling the violent use of guns. We need to defeat racism and we also need to defeat violence caused by guns. But each issue deserves to be challenged on its own terms.

**Private gun ownership is rooted in racist, Southern honor culture—they defend gun ownership, so they link harder**

**Cornell and Ruben 15**

Saul Cornell (Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History at Fordham University) and Eric Ruben (jurisprudence fellow at the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law). “The Slave-State Origins of Modern Gun Rights.” The Atlantic. September 30th, 2015. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-origins-of-public-carry-jurisprudence-in-the-slave-south/407809/

The opinion most enthusiastically embraced by public-carry advocates is Nunn v. State, a state-court decision written by Georgia Chief Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin in 1846. As a jurist, Lumpkin was a champion both of slavery and of the Southern code of honor. Perhaps, not by coincidence, Nunn was the first case in which a court struck down a gun law on the basis of the Second Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court cited Nunn in District of Columbia v. Heller, its landmark 2008 decision holding, for the first time in over 200 years, that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. Why courts or gun-rights advocates think Lumpkin’s view of the right to bear arms provides a solid foundation for modern firearms jurisprudence is puzzling. **Slavery, “honor,” and their associated violence spawned a unique weapons culture.** One of its defining features was a permissive view of white citizens’ right to carry weapons in public. As early as 1840, antebellum historian Richard Hildreth observed that violence was frequently employed in the South both to subordinate slaves and to intimidate abolitionists. In the South, violence also was an approved way to avenge perceived insults to manhood and personal status. According to Hildreth, duels “appear but once an age” in the North, but “are of frequent and almost daily occurrence at the [S]outh.” **Southern men thus carried weapons both “as a protection against the slaves” and also to be prepared for “quarrels between freemen.”** Two of the most feared public-carry weapons in pre-Civil War America, the “Arkansas toothpick” and “Bowie knife,” were forged from this Southern heritage. The slave South’s enthusiasm for public carry influenced its legal culture. During the antebellum years, many viewed carrying a concealed weapon as dastardly and dishonorable—a striking contrast with the values of the modern gun-rights movement. In an 1850 opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that carrying a concealed weapon gave men “secret advantages” and led to “unmanly assassinations,” while open carry “place[d] men upon an equality” and “incite[d] men to a manly and noble defence of themselves.” Some Southern legislatures, accordingly, passed laws permitting open carry but punishing concealment. Southern courts followed their lead, proclaiming a robust right to open carry, but opposing concealed carry, which they deemed unmanly and not constitutionally protected. It is this family of Southern cases that gun-rights advocates would like modern courts to rely on to strike down popularly enacted gun regulations today. But no similar record of court cases exists for the pre-Civil War North. New research produced in response to Heller has revealed a history of gun regulation outside the South that has gone largely unexplored by judges and legal scholars writing about the Second Amendment during the last 30 years. This history reveals strong support for strict regulation of carrying arms in public. In the North, publicly carrying concealable weapons was much less popular than in the South. In 1845, New York jurist William Jay contrasted “those portions of our country where it is supposed essential to personal safety to go armed with pistols and bowie-knives” with the “north and east, where we are unprovided with such facilities for taking life.” Indeed, public-carry restrictions were embraced across the region. In 1836, the respected Massachusetts jurist Peter Oxenbridge Thacher instructed a jury that in Massachusetts “no person may go armed with a dirk, dagger, sword, pistol, or other offensive and dangerous weapon, without reasonable cause to apprehend an assault or violence to his person, family, or property.” Judge Thacher’s charge was celebrated in the contemporary press as “sensible,” “practical,” and “sage.” Massachusetts was not unusual in broadly restricting public carry. Wisconsin, Maine, Michigan, Virginia, Minnesota, Oregon, and Pennsylvania passed laws modeled on the public-carry restriction in Massachusetts. This legal scheme of restricting public carry, it turns out, was not new. Rather, it was rooted in a longstanding tradition of regulating armed travel that dated back to 14th-century England. The English Statute of Northampton prohibited traveling armed “by night [or] by day, in [f]airs, [m]arkets, ... the presence of the [j]ustices or other [m]inisters” or any “part elsewhere.” Early legal commentators in America noted that this English restriction was incorporated into colonial law. As early as 1682, for example, New Jersey constables pledged to arrest any person who “shall ride or go arm’d offensively.” To be sure, there were circumstances where traveling armed was permitted, such as going to muster as part of one’s militia service or hunting in select areas, but the right of states and localities to regulate the public carrying of firearms, particularly in populated places, was undeniable. Today, Americans disagree about the best way to enhance public safety and reduce crime, and that disagreement is voiced in legislatures across the nation. Throughout most of the country and over most of its history, the Second Amendment has not determined the outcome of this debate nor stood in the way of popular public-carry regulations. Then, as now, such regulations were evaluated based on the impact they would have on crime and public safety. At the end of this deadly summer, the debate rages on over how best to balance public safety against the interests of people who wish to “pack heat.” If elected officials decide to restrict the right to carry to those persons who can demonstrate a clear need for a gun, present-day judges should not intervene on the basis of opinions about the right to bear arms from the slave South and its unique culture of violence.

### AT Afropess

AT White people won’t change their view of guns – I don’t claim to solve that because I think this is underbelied by fiat that we can make some grand shift, I advocate

No link – we don’t literally use the state, that’s ridiculous, we take the image of the state hostage to make it’s harmful ideology incoherent – that’s Baudrillard [include why this solves their impacts here]

Perm, do both– the only way to burn down civil society is to make society incoherent through symbolic critique – that’s Baudrillard. The position that we take is a political action outside of the framework of government while we make demands on that framework.

Perm, do the alt in the mindset of our framing, the happy compromise is afro-optimism

**Pessimism violently polices blackness by forcing it to remain within a damned subject position—that precludes lines of flight which black people can pursue within nothingness since blackness is experienced differently by different people**

**Moten 8**

Fred Moten (professor of English at Duke). “The Case of Blackness.” 2008.

The cultural and political discourse on black pathology has been so pervasive that it could be said to constitute the background against which all representations of blacks, blackness, or (the color) black take place. Its manifestations have changed over the years, though it has always been poised between the realms of the pseudo-social scientifi c, the birth of new sciences, and the normative impulse that is at the heart of—but that strains against— the black radicalism that strains against it. From the origins of the critical philosophy in the assertion of its extra-rational foundations in teleological principle; to the advent and solidifi cation of empiricist human biology that moves out of the convergence of phrenology, criminology, and eugenics; to the maturation of (American) sociology in the oscillation between goodand bad-faith attendance to “the negro problem”; to the analysis of and discourse on psychopathology and the deployment of these in both colonial oppression and anticolonial resistance; to the regulatory metaphysics that undergirds interlocking notions of sound and color in aesthetic theory: blackness has been associated with a certain sense of decay, **even when that decay is invoked in the name of a certain (fetishization of) vitality**. **Black radical discourse has often taken up, and held itself within, the stance of the pathologist**. Going back to David Walker, at least, **black radicalism is animated by the question, What’s wrong with black folk?** The extent to which radicalism (here understood as the performance of a general critique of the proper) is a fundamental and enduring force in the black public sphere—so much so that even black “conservatives” are always constrained to begin by defi ning themselves in relation to it—is all but selfevident. Less self-evident is the normative striving against the grain of the very radicalism from which the desire for norms is derived. Such striving is directed toward those lived experiences of blackness that are, on the one hand, aligned with what has been called radical and, on the other hand, aligned not so much with a kind of being-toward-death but with something that has been understood as a deathly or death-driven nonbeing. This strife between normativity and the deconstruction of norms is essential not only to contemporary black academic discourse but also to the discourses of the barbershop, the beauty shop, and the bookstore. I’ll begin with a thought that doesn’t come from any of these zones, though it’s felt in them, strangely, since it posits the being of, and being in, these zones as an ensemble of specifi c impossibilities: As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor internal confl icts, to experience his being through others. There is of course the moment of “being for others,” of which Hegel speaks, but every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society. It would seem that this fact has not been given enough attention by those who have discussed the question. In the Weltanschauung of a colonized people there is an impurity, a fl aw, that outlaws [interdit] any ontological explanation. Someone may object that this is the case with every individual, but such an objection merely conceals a basic problem. Ontology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it upon themselves to remind us that the proposition has a converse. I say that this is false. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.1 This passage, and the ontological (absence of) drama it represents, leads us to a set of fundamental questions. How do we think the possibility and the law of outlawed, impossible things? And if, as Frantz Fanon suggests, the black cannot be an other for another black, if the black can only be an other for a white, then is there ever anything called black social life? Is the designation of this or that thing as lawless, and the assertion that such lawlessness is a function of an already extant fl aw, something more than that trying, even neurotic, oscillation between the exposure and the replication of a regulatory maneuver whose force is held precisely in the assumption that it comes before what it would contain? What’s the relation between explanation and resistance? Who bears the responsibility of discovering an ontology of, or of discovering for ontology, the ensemble of political, aesthetic, and philosophical derangements that comprise the being that is neither for itself nor for the other? What form of life makes such discovery possible as well as necessary? Would we know it by its fl aws, its impurities? What might an impurity in a worldview actually be? Impurity implies a kind of non-completeness, if not absence, of a worldview. Perhaps that noncompleteness signals an originarily criminal refusal of the interplay of framing and grasping, taking and keeping—a certain reticence at the ongoing advent of the age of the world picture. Perhaps it is the reticence of the grasped, the enframed, the taken, the kept—or, more precisely, the reluctance that disrupts grasping and framing, taking and keeping—as epistemological stance as well as accumulative activity. Perhaps this is the fl aw that attends essential, anoriginal impurity—the fl aw that accompanies impossible origins and deviant translations.2 What’s at stake is fugitive movement in and out of the frame, bar, or whatever externally imposed social logic—a movement of escape, the stealth of the stolen that can be said, since it inheres in every closed circle, to break every enclosure. This fugitive movement is stolen life, and its relation to law is reducible neither to simple interdiction nor bare transgression. Part of what can be attained in this zone of unattainability, to which the eminently attainable ones have been relegated, which they occupy but cannot (and refuse to) own, is some sense of **the fugitive law of movement that makes black social life ungovernable**, that demands a **para-ontological disruption** of the supposed connection between explanation and resistance.3 This exchange between matters juridical and matters sociological is given in the mixture of phenomenology and psychopathology that drives Fanon’s work, his slow approach to an encounter with impossible black social life poised or posed in the break, in a certain intransitive evasion of crossing, in the wary mood or fugitive case that ensues between the fact of blackness and the lived experience of the black and as a slippage enacted by the meaning—or, perhaps too “trans-literally,” the (plain[-sung]) sense—of things when subjects are engaged in the representation of objects. The title of this essay, “The Case of Blackness,” is a spin on the title of the fi fth chapter of Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks, infamously mistranslated as “the fact of blackness.” “The lived experience of the black” is more literal—“experience” bears a German trace, translates as Erlebnis rather than Tatsache, and thereby places Fanon within a group of postwar Francophone thinkers encountering phenomenology that includes Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, and Tran Duc Thao.4 The phrasing indicates Fanon’s veering off from an analytic engagement with the world as a set of facts that are available to the natural scientifi c attitude, so it’s possible to feel the vexation of certain commentators with what might be mistaken for a fl irtation with positivism. However, I want to linger in, rather than quickly jump over, the gap between fact and lived experience in order to consider the word “case” as a kind of broken bridge or cut suspension between the two. I’m interested in how the troubled, illicit commerce between fact and lived experience is bound up with that between blackness and the black, a difference that is often concealed, one that plays itself out not by way of the question of accuracy or adequation but by way of the shadowed emergence of the ontological difference between being and beings. Attunement to that difference and its modalities must be fi ne. Perhaps certain recalibrations of Fanon—made possible by insights to which Fanon is both given and blind—will allow us to show the necessity and possibility of another understanding of the ontological difference. In such an understanding, the political phonochoreography of being’s words bears a content that cannot be left by the wayside even if it is packaged in the pathologization of blacks and blackness in the discourse of the human and natural sciences and in the corollary emergence of expertise as the defi ning epistemological register of the modern subject who is in that he knows, regulates, but cannot be black. This might turn out to have much to do with the constitution of that locale in which “ontological explanation” is precisely insofar as it is against the law. One way to investigate the lived experience of the black is to consider what it is to be the dangerous—because one is, because we are (Who? We? Who is this we? Who volunteers for this already given imposition? Who elects this imposed affi nity? The one who is homelessly, hopefully, less and more?) the constitutive—supplement. What is it to be an irreducibly disordering, deformational force while at the same time being absolutely indispensable to normative order, normative form? This is not the same as, though it does probably follow from, the troubled realization that one is an object in the midst of other objects, as Fanon would have it. In their introduction to a rich and important collection of articles that announce and enact a new deployment of Fanon in black studies’ encounter with visual studies, Jared Sexton and Huey Copeland index Fanon’s formulation in order to consider what it is to be “the thing against which all other subjects take their bearing.”5 But something is left unattended in their invocation of Fanon, in their move toward equating objecthood with “the domain of non-existence” or the interstitial space between life and death, something to be understood in its difference from and relation to what Giorgio Agamben calls naked life, something they call raw life, that moves—or more precisely cannot move—in its forgetful non-relation to that quickening, forgetive force that Agamben calls the form of life Sexton and Copeland turn to the Fanon of Black Skins, White Masks, the phenomenologist of (the lived experience of) blackness, who provides for them the following epigraph: I came into the world imbued with the will to fi nd a meaning in things, my spirit fi lled with the desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found that I was an object in the midst of other objects. (Black Skins, 77) [J’arrivais dans le monde, soucieux de faire lever un sens aux choses, mon âme pleine du désir d’être à l’origine du monde, et voici que je me découvrais objet au milieu d’autres objets.]7 Fanon writes of entering the world with a melodramatic imagination, as Peter Brooks would have it—one drawn toward the occult installation of the sacred in things, gestures (certain events, as opposed to actions, of muscularity), and in the subterranean fi eld that is, paradoxically, signaled by the very cutaneous darkness of which Fanon speaks. That darkness turns the would-be melodramatic subject not only into an object but also into a sign—the hideous blackamoor at the entrance of the cave, that world underneath the world of light that Fanon will have entered, who guards and masks “our” hidden motives and desires.8 There’s a whole other economy of skins and masks to be addressed here. However, I will defer that address in order to get at something (absent) in Sexton and Copeland. What I am after is something obscured by the fall from prospective subject to object that Fanon recites—namely, a transition from thing(s) (choses) to object (objet) that turns out to version a slippage or movement that could be said to animate the history of philosophy. What if we bracket the movement from (erstwhile) subject to object in order to investigate more adequately the change from object to thing (a change as strange as that from the possibility of intersubjectivity that attends majority to whatever is relegated to the plane or plain of the minor)? What if the thing whose meaning or value has never been found finds things, founds things? What if the thing will have founded something against the very possibility of foundation and against all anti- or post-foundational impossibilities? What if the thing sustains itself in that absence or eclipse of meaning that withholds from the thing the horrific honorific of “object”? At the same time, what if the value of that absence or excess is given to us only in and by way of a kind of failure or inadequacy—or, perhaps more precisely, by way of a history of exclusion, serial expulsion, presence’s ongoing taking of leave—so that the non-attainment of meaning or ontology, of source or origin, is the only way to approach the thing in its informal (enformed/enforming, as opposed to formless), material totality? Perhaps **this would be cause for black optimism** or, at least, some black operations. Perhaps the thing, **the black, is tantamount to another, fugitive, sublimity** altogether. Some/thing escapes in or through the object’s vestibule; the object vibrates against its frame like a resonator, and troubled air gets out. The air of the thing that escapes enframing is what I’m interested in—an often unattended movement that accompanies largely unthought positions and appositions. To operate out of this interest might mispresent itself as a kind of refusal of Fanon.9 But my reading is enabled by the way Fanon’s texts continually demand that we read them—again or, deeper still, not or against again, but for the fi rst time. I wish to engage a kind of preop( tical) optimism in Fanon that is tied to the commerce between the lived experience of the black and the fact of blackness and between the thing and the object—an optimism recoverable, one might say, only by way of mistranslation, that bridged but unbridgeable gap that Heidegger explores as both distance and nearness in his discourse on “The Thing.” Michael Inwood moves quickly in his explication of Heidegger’s distinction between Ding and Sache: “Ding, ‘thing,’ is distinct from Sache, ‘thing, (subject-) matter, affair.’ Sache, like the Latin res, originally denoted a legal case or a matter of concern, while Ding was the ‘court’ or ‘assembly’ before which a case was discussed.”10 In Heidegger’s essay “Das Ding,” the speed of things is a bit more deliberate, perhaps so that the distinction between things and human affairs can be maintained against an explicatory velocity that threatens to abolish the distance between, which is also to say the nearness of, the two: “[T]he Old High German word thing means a gathering, and specifi - cally a gathering to deliberate on a matter under discussion, a contested matter. In consequence, the Old German words thing and ding become the names for an affair or matter of pertinence. They denote anything that in any way bears upon men, concerns them, and that accordingly is a matter for discourse.”11 The descent from Old High German to Old German is held here and matters. The trajectory of that descent is at issue such that we are to remain concerned with the detachment and proximity of “a gathering to deliberate” and “contested matter.” It might even be worthwhile to think of the gathering as contested matter, to linger in the break—the distance and nearness—between the thing and the case in the interest of the ones who are without interests but who are nevertheless a concern precisely because they gather, as they are gathered matter, the internally differentiated materiality of a collective head. The thing of it is, the case of blackness. THE CASE OF BLACKNESS 183 For Heidegger, the jug is an exemplary thing. The jug is a vessel; it holds something else within it. It is also “self-supporting, or independent.” But “[d]oes the vessel’s self-support alone defi ne the jug as a thing?” The potter makes the earthen jug out of earth that he has specially chosen and prepared for it. The jug consists of that earth. By virtue of what the jug consists of, it too can stand on the earth, either immediately or through the mediation of table and bench. What exists by such producing is what stands on its own, is self-supporting. When we take the jug as a made vessel, then surely we are apprehending it—so it seems—as a thing and never as a mere object. Or do we even now still take the jug as an object? Indeed. It is, to be sure, no longer considered only an object of a mere act of representation, but in return it is an object which a process of making has set up before and against us. Its selfsupport seems to mark the jug as a thing. But in truth we are thinking of this self-support in terms of the making process. Self-support is what the making aims at. But even so, the self-support is still thought of in terms of objectness, even though the over-againstness of what has been put forth is no longer grounded in mere representation, in the mere putting it before our minds. But from the objectness of the object, and from the product’s self-support, there is no way that leads to the thingness of the thing. (Heidegger 167) This is to say, importantly I think, that the “jug remains a vessel whether we represent it in our minds or not” (167). (Later Heidegger says: “Man can represent, no matter how, only what has previously come to light of its own accord and has shown itself to him in the light it brought with it” [171].) Its thingliness does not inhere in its having been made or produced or represented. For Heidegger, the thingliness of the thing, the jug, is precisely that which prompts its making. For Plato—and the tradition of representational thinking he codifi es, which includes Fanon—everything present is experienced as an object of making where “object” is understood, in what Heidegger calls its most precise expression, as “what stands forth” (rather than what stands before or opposite or against). In relation to Fanon, Kara Keeling calls upon us to think that which stands forth as project and as problem. Accordingly, I am after a kind of shadow or trace in Fanon—the moment in which phenomenology strains against its own, shall we say, reifi cation of a certain philosophical experience, its own problematic commitment to what 184 FRED MOTEN emerges from making, in order to get at “a meaning of things.” Though decisive and disruptive in ways that remain to be thought, that strain is momentary in Fanon, momentarily displaced precisely by that “representation of what is present, in the sense of what stands forth and of what stands over against as an object” that never, according to Heidegger, “reaches to the thing qua thing” (168–69). For Heidegger, the jug’s being, as vessel, is momentarily understood as being-in-its emptiness, the empty space that holds, the impalpable void brought forth by the potter as container. “And yet,” Heidegger asks, “Is the jug really empty” (169)? He argues that the jug’s putative emptiness is a semi-poetic misprision, that “the jug is fi lled with air and with everything that goes to make up the air’s mixture” (169). Perhaps the jug, as thing, is better understood as fi lled with an always already mixed capacity for content that is not made. This is something other than either poetic emptiness or a strictly scientifi c fullness that understands the fi lling of the jug as simple displacement. As Heidegger puts it, “Considered scientifi cally, to fi ll a jug means to exchange one fi lling for another.” He adds, These statements of physics are correct. By means of them, science represents something real, by which it is objectively controlled. But—is this reality the jug? No. Science always encounters only what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science. . . . Science makes the jug-thing into a nonentity in not permitting things to be the standard for what is real. Science’s knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things as things long before the atom bomb exploded. The bomb’s explosion is only the grossest of all gross confi rmations of the long-since-accomplished annihilation of the thing: the confi rmation that the thing as a thing remains nil. The thingness of the thing remains concealed, forgotten. The nature of the thing never comes to light, that is, it never gets a hearing. This is the meaning of our talk about the annihilation of the thing. (170) “The Lived Experience of the Black” bears not only a lament over Fanon’s own relegation to the status of object; it also contains a lament that it suppresses over the general annihilation of the thing to which transcendental phenomenology contributes insofar as it is concerned with Sachen, not Dinge, in what remains untranslatable as its direction toward the things themselves. Insofar as blackness remains the object of a complex disavowing claim in Fanon, one bound up precisely with his **understanding of blackness as an impure product—as a function of a making that is not its own**, an intentionality that could never have been its own—it could be said that Fanon **moves within an economy of annihilation** even though, at the same time, he mourns his own intentional comportment toward a hermeneutics of thingliness. Is blackness brought to light in Fanon’s ambivalence? Is blackness given a hearing—or, more precisely, does blackness give itself to a hearing—in his phenomenological description (which is not but nothing other than a representation) of it? Studying the case of blackness is inseparable from the case blackness makes for itself in spite and by way of every interdiction. In any case, it will have been as if one has come down with a case of blackness. Meanwhile, Heidegger remains with the question of the essential nature of the thing that “has never yet been able to appear” (171). He asks, What does the jug hold and how does it hold? “How does the jug’s void hold” (171)? By taking and keeping what it holds but also, and most fundamentally, in a way that constitutes the unity, the belonging together, of taking and keeping, in the outpouring of what is held. “The holding of the vessel occurs in the giving of the outpouring. . . . We call the gathering of the twofold holding into the outpouring, which, as being together, fi rst constitutes the full presence of giving: the poured gift. The jug’s jug-character consists in the poured gift of the pouring out. Even the empty jug retains its nature by virtue of the poured gift, even though the empty jug does not admit of a giving out” (172). What is it to speak of this outpouring, to speak of the thing, the vessel, in terms of what it gives, particularly when we take into account the horror of its being made to hold, the horror of its making that it holds or bears? This question is necessary and decisive precisely insofar as it insists upon a rough-hewn accompaniment to Heidegger’s talk of gift and consecration. Sometimes what is given is refusal. How does refusal elevate celebration? Heidegger invokes the “gush” as strong outpouring, as sacrifi - cial fl ow, but perhaps what accentuates the outpouring, what makes it more than “mere fi lling and decanting,” is a withholding that is aligned with refusal, a canted secret (173). At any rate, in the outpouring that is the essence of the thing/vessel dwells the Heideggerian fourfold of earth, sky, divinity, and mortals that precedes everything that is present or that is represented. The fourfold, as staying and as appropriation is where thing approaches, if not becomes, event. This gathering, this event of gathering, is, for Heidegger, what is denoted in the Old High German word “thing.” By way of Meister Eckhart, Heidegger asserts that “Thing is . . . the cautious and abstemious name for something that is at all.” He adds: Because the word thing as used in Western metaphysics denotes that which is at all and is something in some way or other, the meaning of the name “thing” varies with the 186 FRED MOTEN interpretation of that which is—of entities. Kant talks about things in the same way as Meister Eckhart and means by this term something that is. But for Kant, that which is becomes the object of a representing that runs its course in the selfconsciousness of the human ego. The thing-in-itself means for Kant: the object-in-itself. To Kant, the character of the “in-itself” signifi es that the object is an object in itself without reference to the human act of representing it, that is, without the opposing “ob-” by which it is fi rst of all put before the representing act. “Thing-in-itself,” thought in a rigorously Kantian way, means an object that is no object for us, because it is supposed to stand, stay put, without a possible before: for the human representational act that encounters it. (176–77) Meanwhile, in contradistinction to Kant, Heidegger thinks being neither as idea nor as position/objectness (the transcendental character of being posed) but as thing. He might be best understood as speaking out of a clearing, or a fl aw, that also constitutes a step back or away from the kind of thinking that produces worldviews or, at least, that particular worldview that accompanies what, for lack of a better turn, might be called intersubjection. Fanon offers, by way of retrospection, a reversal of that step back or away. In briefl y narrating the history of his own becoming-object, the trajectory of his own being-positioned in and by representational thinking, Fanon fatefully participates in that thinking and fails to depart from the “sphere of mere attitudes” (Heidegger 181). At the same time, Fanon, and the experience that he both carries and analyzes, places the Heideggerian distinction between being (thing) and Dasein—the being to whom understandings of being are given; the not, but nothing other than, human being—in a kind of jeopardy that was already implicit, however much it is held within an interplay between being overlooked and being overseen. So I’m interested in how the ones who inhabit the nearness and distance between Dasein and things (which is off to the side of what lies between subjects and objects), the ones who are attained or accumulated unto death even as they are always escaping the Hegelian positioning of the bondsman, are perhaps best understood as the extra-ontological, extra-political constant—a destructive, healing agent; a stolen, transplanted organ always eliciting rejection; a salve whose soothing lies in the abrasive penetration of the merely typical; an ensemble always operating in excess of that ancient juridical formulation of the thing (Ding), to which Kant subscribes, as that to which nothing can be imputed, the impure, degraded, manufactured (in) THE CASE OF BLACKNESS 187 human who moves only in response to inclination, whose refl exes lose the name of action. At the same time, this dangerous supplement, as the fact out of which everything else emerges, is constitutive. It seems to me that this special ontic-ontological fugitivity of/in the slave is what is revealed as the necessarily unaccounted for in Fanon. So that in contradistinction to Fanon’s protest, the problem of the inadequacy of any ontology to blackness, to that mode of being for which escape or apposition and not the objectifying encounter with otherness is the prime modality, must be understood in its relation to the inadequacy of calculation to being in general. Moreover, the brutal history of criminalization in public policy, and at the intersection of biological, psychological, and sociological discourse, ought not obscure the already existing ontic-ontological criminality of/as blackness. Rather, blackness needs to be understood as operating at the nexus of the social and the ontological, the historical and the essential. Indeed, as the ontological is moving within the corrosive increase that the ontic instantiates, it must be understood that what is now meant by ontological requires special elucidation. What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies. The lived experienced of blackness is, among other things, a constant demand for an ontology of disorder, an ontology of dehiscence, a para-ontology whose comportment will have been (toward) the ontic or existential fi eld of things and events. That ontology will have had to have operated as a general critique of calculation even as it gathers diaspora as an open set—or as an openness disruptive of the very idea of set—of accumulative and **unaccumulable differences**, differings, departures without origin, leavings that continually defy the natal occasion in general even as they constantly bespeak the previous. This is a Nathaniel Mackey formulation whose full implications will have never been fully explorable.12 What Fanon’s pathontological refusal of blackness leaves unclaimed is an irremediable homelessness common to the colonized, the enslaved, and the enclosed. This is to say that what is claimed in the name of blackness is an undercommon disorder that has always been there, that is retrospectively and retroactively located there, that is embraced by the ones who stay there while living somewhere else. Some folks relish being a problem. As Amiri Baraka and Nikhil Pal Singh (almost) say, “Black(ness) is a country” (and a sex) (that is not one).13 Stolen life disorders positive value just as surely as it is not equivalent to social death or absolute dereliction. So if we cannot simply give an account of things that, in the very fugitivity and impossibility that is the essence of their existence, resist accounting, how do we speak of the lived experience of the black? What limits are placed on such speaking when it comes from the position of the black, but also what constraints are placed on the very concept of lived experience, particularly in its relation to the black when black social life is interdicted? Note that the interdiction exists not only as a function of what might be broadly understood as policy but also as a function of an **epistemological consensus broad enough to include Fanon, on the one hand, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan**, on the other—encompassing formulations that might be said not only to characterize but also to initiate and continually re-initialize the philosophy of the human sciences. In other words, the notion that there is no black social life is part of a set of variations on a theme that include assertions of the irreducible pathology of black social life and **the implication that (non-pathological) social life is what emerges by way of the exclusion of the black** or, more precisely, of blackness. But what are we to make of the pathological here? What are the implications of a social life that, on the one hand, is not what it is and, on the other hand, is irreducible to what it is used for? This discordant echo of one of Theodor W. Adorno’s most infamous assertions about jazz implies that black social life reconstitutes the music that is its phonographic.14 That music, which Miles Davis calls “social music,” to which Adorno and Fanon gave only severe and partial hearing, is of interdicted black social life operating on frequencies that are disavowed—though they are also amplifi ed—in the interplay of sociopathological and phenomenological description. How can we fathom a social life that tends toward death, that enacts a kind of being-toward-death, and which, because of such tendency and enactment, maintains a terribly beautiful vitality? Deeper still, what are we to make of the fact of a sociality that emerges when lived experience is distinguished from fact, in the fact of life that is implied in the very phenomenological gesture/analysis within which Fanon asserts black social life as, in all but the most minor ways, impossible? How is it that the off harmony of life, sociality, and blackness is the condition of possibility of the claim that there is no black social life? Does black life, in its irreducible and impossible sociality and precisely in what might be understood as its refusal of the status of social life that is refused it, constitute a fundamental danger—an excluded but immanent disruption—to social life? What will it have meant to embrace this matrix of im/possibility, to have spoken of and out of this suspension? What would it mean to dwell on or in minor social life? This set of questions is imposed upon us by Fanon. At the same time, and in a way that is articulated most clearly and famously by W. E. B. Du Bois, this set of questions is the position, which is also to say the problem, of blackness.

Their pessimism is a symptom that we solve – Your pessimism begs the question of why radical change is impossible, radical change for Black folk only ***seems*** impossible because as a socially dead body, fear of death applies disproportionately to Black life and encompasses it. Absent fear of death, liberation movements appear as the necessary try- or-die scenarios they are.

### AT Anthro

No link – we critique fear of death which is the type humanist logic they critique. Fear of death centers our focus on the self and blights out the experiences of the Other which isn’t limited to human Others – that’s Robinson.

**Perm, the aff teaches us to learn how to die gracefully. Human extinction from anthropogenic collapse is coming and the only way to absolve the nature/human dualism they critique is to recognize our futility.**

**Scranton 13**

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**There’s a word for this new era we live in: the Anthropocene**. This term, taken up by [geologists](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/835.abstract), [pondered by intellectuals](http://www.livingbooksaboutlife.org/books/Extinction) and discussed in the pages of publications such as [The Economist](http://www.economist.com/node/18741749) and the [The New York Times](http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/19/the-age-of-anthropocene-should-we-worry), represents the idea that we have entered a new epoch in Earth’s geological history, one characterized by the arrival of the human species as a geological force. The Nobel-Prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen coined the term in 2002, and it has steadily gained acceptance as evidence has increasingly mounted that the changes wrought by global warming will affect not just the world’s climate and biological diversity, but its very geology — and not just for a few centuries, but for millenniums. The geophysicist David Archer’s 2009 book, “[The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the Next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate](http://www.amazon.com/Long-Thaw-Changing-Climate-Essentials/dp/0691136548),” lays out a clear and concise argument for how huge concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and melting ice will radically transform the planet, beyond freak storms and warmer summers, beyond any foreseeable future.¶ The Stratigraphy Commission of the Geological Society of London — the scientists responsible for pinning the “golden spikes” that demarcate geological epochs such as the Pliocene, Pleistocene, and Holocene — have adopted the Anthropocene as a term deserving further consideration, [“significant on the scale of Earth history.”](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1938/1036.full)Working groups are discussing what level of geological time-scale it might be (an “epoch” like the Holocene, or merely an “age” like the Calabrian), and at what date we might say it began. The beginning of the Great Acceleration, in the middle of the 20th century? The beginning of the Industrial Revolution, around 1800? The advent of agriculture?¶ The challenge **the Anthropocene poses** is **a challenge not just** to national security, to food and energy markets, or **to our “way of life”** — though these challenges are all real, profound, and inescapable. **The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses may be to our sense of what it means to be human**. Within 100 years — within three to five generations — we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher than today, rising seas at least three to 10 feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons and population centers. Within a thousand years, unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale right now, humans will be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feethigher than they are today. **We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well on its way, and our own possible extinction. I**f homo sapiens (or some genetically modified variant) survives the next millenniums, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have inhabited.¶ Geological time scales, civilizational collapse and species extinction give rise to profound problems that humanities scholars and academic philosophers, with their taste for fine-grained analysis, esoteric debates and archival marginalia, might seem remarkably ill suited to address. After all, how will thinking about Kant help us trap carbon dioxide? Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, and contemporary metaphysicians going to keep Bangladesh from being inundated by rising oceans?¶ Of course not. **But the biggest problems the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the root of humanistic and philosophical questioning: “What does it mean to be human?” and “What does it mean to live?”** In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality — **“What does my life mean in the face of death?”** — is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. What does human existence mean against 100,000 years of climate change? What does one life mean in the face of species death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful choices in the shadow of our inevitable end?¶ These questions have no logical or empirical answers. **They are philosophical problems** par excellence. Many thinkers, including Cicero, Montaigne, Karl Jaspers, and The Stone’s own Simon Critchley, have argued that studying philosophy is learning how to die. If that’s true, then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age — for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. **The rub is that now we have to learn how to die not as individuals, but as a civilization**.¶ III.¶ **Learning how to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea.** Baghdad seemed incredibly dangerous, even though statistically I was pretty safe. We got shot at and mortared, and I.E.D.’s laced every highway, but I had good armor, we had a great medic, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. The odds were good I would come home. Maybe wounded, but probably alive. Every day I went out on mission, though, I looked down the barrel of the future and saw a dark, empty hole.¶ “For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her remarkable meditation on war, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force.” “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” That was the face I saw in the mirror, and its gaze nearly paralyzed me.¶ I found my way forward through an 18th-century Samurai manual, Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s “Hagakure,” which commanded: “**Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” Instead of fearing my end, I owned it**. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I’d imagine getting blown up by an I.E.D., shot by a sniper, burned to death, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded, and succumbing to dysentery. Then, before we rolled out through the gate, **I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry, because I was already dead**. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. “If by setting one’s heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body were already dead,” wrote Tsunetomo, “he gains freedom in the Way.”¶ I got through my tour in Iraq one day at a time, meditating each morning on my inevitable end. When I left Iraq and came back stateside, I thought I’d left that future behind. Then I saw it come home in the chaos that was unleashed after Katrina hit New Orleans. And then I saw it again when Sandy battered New York and New Jersey: Government agencies [failed to move quickly enough](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/nyregion/new-york-city-housing-agency-was-overwhelmed-after-storm.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0), and [volunteer groups like Team Rubicon had to step in](http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2012/12/6900518/gap-citys-hurricane-response-and-volunteer-armys-attempt-fill-it) to manage disaster relief.¶ **Now, when I look into our future — into the Anthropocene — I see water rising up to wash out lower Manhattan. I see food riots, hurricanes, and climate refugees. I see 82nd Airborne soldiers shooting looters. I see grid failure, wrecked harbors, Fukushima waste, and plagues. I see Baghdad.** I see the Rockaways. I see a strange, precarious world.¶ Our new home.¶ **The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end.** Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today — it is unnatural for us to think that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like this forever, burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coal mine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our fantasies of perpetual growth, permanent innovation and endless energy, just as the reality of mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence.¶ The biggest problem climate change poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, or how we should put up sea walls to protect Alphabet City, or when we should evacuate Hoboken. **It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, signing a treaty, or turning off the air-conditioning. The biggest problem we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead.** **The sooner we confront this problem, and the sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality**.¶ The choice is a clear one. **We can continue acting as if tomorrow will be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the present offers without attachment or fear. If we want to learn to live in the Anthropocene, we must first learn how to die.**

**So**

Dissolving fear of death is a necessary prerequisite to us creating peaceable relationships with the nonhuman Other because it expands our area of concern beyond the self – that’s Stavrakakis

Link Turn – fear of death is based in the modern drive to maximize productivity, only those alive are seen as productive – that’s Robinson. Blindly maximizing productivity and the egoism that the 1AC rejects are the root cause of the anthropocene and environmental degradation, which are the biggest impacts under anthro.

Link Turn – anthropocentrism is just a liberalization of the fear of death, we only care about nonhuman struggle because of global warming and the threat is poses for us. Their false sentimentalism is the same threat construction that the 1AC critiques.

### AT Statism

Lol we’re just about as subversive as you get and literally make fun of the state.

### AT Util

1. Util’s roots are in fear of death even if you say you’re about pleasure maximizing util you can’t abstractify that far – Robinson takes into account that within the capitalist system, util logic must fear death because live bodies are the only productive ones so we naturally lead to life maximization, few impacts:
   1. Turn – fear of death leads to creation of culture to pacify our fear of death through images like religion, when that is faced with opposition it leads to violence in fear of mortality – that’s Solomon and is empirically and historically confirmed so our impact outweighs on probability and timeframe because it’s structural
   2. Value to Life – No impact to the Disad, extinction has already happened but we can revive ourselves. The quest for immortality only maximizes life but doesn’t prescribe how to make life worth living – that’s Babich. No value to life means his life maximization claims mean nothing.
   3. Threat Construction – his utilitarian politics obscures the truth, to us the impact of handguns increasing crime empirically means little but their method of creating political action through obfuscating truth leads to destructive hierarchies.

### AT 50 States/Any Policy CP

1. Before you can read a counterplan you need a plan to compete with, the 1AC is a radical denial of such a thing. How can we have a plan if the resolution can’t feasibly be implemented. The 1AC is a prior issue to any aff plan and any counter plan – everything on case proves this.

### AT Baudrillard Indicts (Greenhill)

They flowed one card of the 1AC and posited me Sean Fahey as Jean Baudrillard, do I look like Baudrillard? Don’t answer that. The 1AC is my argument and Baudrillard is part of it. When they say debate can add praxis to the illusion that Baudrillard talks about, I agree and that’s why I did it here. Tons of empirics on the 1ac flow straight past their indicts – Solomon is an empirical verification that we react violently to the notion of death, Kleck shows that psychology is a core of the topic issue, Arnett shows how fear of death is used to distract us from the truth, Baudrillard gives us a political strategy from his alchemist basement and here I am putting it into praxis. Next time listen to the 1AC.

**Baudrillard 97 Explanation**

The Baudrillard evidence says that if structures of power use psychological tactics like fear of death to justify bad policies that working within that framework is self-defeating. This does not deny reform or change, it calls for a grassroots critique of the state in the same way that Black Lives Matter protests against the state because they don’t like the existing framework. The political strategy of hostage taking is uniquely good because it allows us to make a political statement outside of that framework while still placing demands on it, if the system shuts down our speech then it only further proves our point that it uses the same violence it tells us to be scared of. These are the sort of situations we have to put powerful actors in to hold them accountable to the people – there is nothing ridiculously post modern about this, this is what we did in the American Revolution.

**2AR**

He has conceded the warrant in Robinson that powerful actors use fear of death coercively, he has also conceded Solomon which argues that empirically we lash out against different cultures at the sight of mortality. This gives a lot of credence to Peterson, which makes the aff a prior question, white subjects fear death which they experience because they exist, to then project a lack of ontology onto the Black Other such that their fear of death does not seem so bad. The 1AC is a speech act in round that endorses that handguns, an empirical symbol of fear of death and fear of the other, should be rejected by rejecting fiat a tool of the political actors that use fear of death – that’s Robinson.

1. Hochul Kwak (Claremont Graduate University). “Rights of Concrete Others: Ethics of Concrete Others, Social Individuality, and Social Multiculturalism.” CGU Theses and Dissertations. 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1064&context=cgu\_etd [↑](#footnote-ref-1)